After his victory in the 1988 presidential election, Ranasinghe Premadasa described his mandate as being akin to holding a “two-pronged lantern.” By this, he referred to the dual challenges he faced: the conflict in the north and the JVP uprising in the south. At that time, while there wasn’t an active war in the traditional sense, the northern and eastern provinces were under occupation by a foreign military force.
During the election campaign, Premadasa had pledged to expel the Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) from the North and East, transform the Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord into a friendship treaty, and establish peace in the South through negotiations with the JVP. However, fulfilling these promises seemed almost impossible. The withdrawal of the IPKF appeared unimaginable, as Prabhakaran and the LTTE had rejected the Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord.
The Indian Army had been deployed in Sri Lanka to disarm Prabhakaran and the LTTE. According to the Indo-Lanka agreement, the Indian forces were to remain in the country until either Prabhakaran surrendered his weapons or the LTTE was defeated. At the time, neither outcome seemed achievable, and the idea of the Indian Army leaving Sri Lanka was far from reality.
India should have been persuaded to transform the Indo-Lanka Agreement into a friendly treaty. However, convincing India to revise a signed agreement was no easy task.
Another major challenge was establishing peace in the South, which required the JVP to disarm and engage in negotiations. At the time, this seemed implausible. The alternative was suppressing the JVP through force, a strategy that J.R. Jayewardene’s government had attempted unsuccessfully. The JVP and SLFP argued that neither J.R., Premadasa, nor the UNP could expel Indian troops, overturn the Indo-Lanka Agreement, or bring peace. They claimed only a government led by the JVP or SLFP could achieve these goals. This argument resonated with the public, as the UNP government had invited the Indian army and signed the controversial agreement, with Premadasa serving as Prime Minister at the time.
Furthermore, the JVP rebellion was largely attributed to the mistakes of the UNP government. Many doubted the UNP could suppress the JVP effectively if it returned to power. Yet, Premadasa won the election. After his victory, he did not acknowledge the difficulties in fulfilling his campaign promises. Instead, he quietly devised strategies to achieve them.
One of his seemingly unachievable promises was the Janasaviya program. Critics, including Ronnie de Mel, a former Finance Minister, claimed the World Bank would not fund it. However, Premadasa played a calculated game. He recognized that removing the Indian army required bringing the LTTE to the negotiating table to convince India there was no longer a need for foreign troops. Using diplomacy and pressure—including a threat to commit suicide if the Indian army didn’t leave—he managed to send the troops back to India. This move silenced critics like the JVP and SLFP, who had framed the Indian army as a national threat.
Premadasa also initiated efforts to renegotiate the Indo-Lanka Agreement, aiming to transform it into a friendly accord. At the same time, he extended an olive branch to the JVP, inviting them to negotiations and urging them to trust his leadership. When the JVP refused, Premadasa resorted to suppressing their rebellion, successfully restoring peace in the South and surprising his political opponents.
He also countered Ronnie de Mel’s claims by assembling a skilled team to prepare a compelling project report for the Janasaviya program, which ultimately secured World Bank funding. Even at the time of his assassination, Premadasa was negotiating with India to amend the Indo-Lanka Agreement.
Premadasa achieved these feats in a country plagued by chaos: foreign troops occupied part of the nation, state institutions were paralyzed, curfews were constant, and the economy was in shambles. Yet, within a year, he extinguished the flames of conflict. He launched 100 projects in the garment industry, established the Koggala Free Trade Zone, secured funds from the Asian Development Bank for the Southern Expressway, and laid plans to connect it to the Free Trade Zone. He built villages and hotels like Kandalama to revive tourism and create jobs, bolstering foreign reserves.
If Premadasa were President today, he would likely prioritize renegotiating the IMF agreement, restructuring debt in Sri Lanka’s favour, and providing immediate relief to the most vulnerable. Simultaneously, he would launch large-scale projects, form specialized teams to attract foreign aid and investment and revitalize the economy.
Though Premadasa was not highly educated or an expert in international relations, his fearlessness and adaptability set him apart. Today’s leaders, like Anura, who struggle to fulfil their promises, could learn valuable lessons from Premadasa’s pragmatic leadership and unwavering commitment to his vision.
