“Madam, don’t try to form a government with the JVP. Both the government and the country would head toward a natural disaster…”
This was the advice an astrologer reportedly gave then-President Chandrika Kumaratunga in 2004 when she was preparing to contest the parliamentary election in alliance with the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP). Chandrika, however, paid little attention to the warning. Her main objective was to bring down Ranil Wickremesinghe’s government and send Ranil and the United National Party (UNP) into opposition. She signed an agreement with the JVP, formed the United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA), contested the election, and won.
The 2004 parliamentary election was a political tsunami, much like the election won by the JVP-led alliance in 2024. Anura Bandaranaike, the political heir to the Bandaranaike family, finished second in the preferential vote count in the Gampaha District, while the top position went to JVP candidate Vijitha Herath. Similar results were seen in other districts, where leading SLFP figures were pushed into second place behind JVP candidates. Many prominent SLFP politicians failed even to secure parliamentary seats. The JVP filled the vacuum and won 41 seats.
The result shocked not only Chandrika but the entire Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP). JVP MPs including Anura Kumara Dissanayake, Vijitha Herath, K.D. Lal Kantha, and Chandrasena Wijesinghe were sworn in as Cabinet ministers. Bimal Ratnayake, Samantha Vidyaratne, Sunil Handunnetti, and Nihal Galappaththi became deputy ministers.
However, conflict between Chandrika and the JVP emerged almost immediately after the Cabinet was formed. The first dispute arose when Anura Kumara demanded that the Mahaweli Ministry be placed under his Agriculture Ministry. At the time, the Mahaweli portfolio was held by then SLFP General Secretary Maithripala Sirisena, who was unwilling to give it up.
That was only the first clash. Subsequently, JVP ministers opposed Cabinet proposals put forward by Chandrika to privatise loss-making state enterprises. Under pressure from the JVP, Chandrika had also suspended dealings with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The IMF even closed its Colombo office and left the country.
It was during this period that the 2004 tsunami struck Sri Lanka. The disaster shook the entire nation. To facilitate international aid for reconstruction, the United States, Britain, Europe and other donors, with Norway’s involvement, proposed an assistance package. They recommended the creation of a joint mechanism involving both the Government and the LTTE to manage relief distribution.
Thus emerged the Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS), a relief mechanism consisting of representatives from both the Government and the LTTE. Norway acted as the mediator in the discussions.
The JVP had agreed to contest the 2004 election with Chandrika only on the condition that she would not sign any agreement with the LTTE that could be viewed as compromising the country’s sovereignty. It had also insisted that there should be no negotiations with the LTTE under Norwegian mediation. According to this account, Chandrika violated all those conditions.
By then, pressure was mounting within the JVP itself. Many party members believed the Government was becoming increasingly unpopular because of the fallout from the tsunami disaster and argued that the party should withdraw from the administration. Although JVP ministers frequently clashed with Chandrika in Cabinet, they were initially reluctant to leave the Government outright.
Eventually, the party concluded that remaining in office would force it to share responsibility for the Government’s failures and declining public support. The P-TOMS agreement provided the ideal opportunity to break away. As soon as Chandrika signed the agreement, the JVP withdrew from the Government.
The withdrawal was presented as a principled stand, and the party regained much of its public support. It was this renewed political momentum that later enabled the JVP to play a decisive role in helping Mahinda Rajapaksa win the presidency.
After Mahinda became President, the JVP was uncertain about whether it should join his administration. Mahinda, for his part, was also reluctant to bring the JVP into government and create potential tensions. By then, he had resumed peace talks with the LTTE under Norwegian mediation, placing the JVP in a difficult position.
The JVP realised that its own nationalist credentials could be undermined by Mahinda’s negotiations with the LTTE. Yet, unlike its split from Chandrika, breaking away from Mahinda immediately would have made the party appear inconsistent and opportunistic. Instead, the JVP successfully pressured Mahinda toward a military solution.
However, during the early stages of the war, Mahinda’s government suffered LTTE air attacks and several military setbacks. The wartime economy came under strain, people faced growing hardships, and Sri Lanka was further affected by the global economic crisis.
The JVP calculated that Mahinda would be unable to win the war. It feared that if the conflict dragged on, the country would face economic collapse and the blame might fall partly on the party. At the same time, relations deteriorated as Mahinda attracted nationalist figures from within JVP ranks, including Wimal Weerawansa.
As a result, the JVP decided to defeat Mahinda’s 2008 Budget and leave the Government. Before that could happen, however, Mahinda managed to split the JVP and secure parliamentary approval for the Budget.
According to this narrative, after helping both Chandrika and Mahinda come to power, the JVP eventually distanced itself from them because it did not want to shoulder responsibility for the consequences of governing alongside them.
Today, however, the situation is different. The Government itself is a JVP-led administration, and Anura Kumara Dissanayake, the leader of the JVP, is President. Any successes or failures of the Government now fall directly on the party’s shoulders.
“Can the JVP separate itself from Anura the way it separated itself from Chandrika and Mahinda?”
Anura is the leader of the JVP. When the party broke with Chandrika, she was the leader of the SLFP. When it parted ways with Mahinda, he too was the SLFP leader. In both cases, the JVP was separating from leaders of another party.
It cannot do the same with Anura because he is its own leader. To distance itself from him, the JVP would first have to remove him as party leader and appoint someone else in his place.
The JVP is not like most other political parties. It has historically shown a willingness to replace leaders when necessary. That is how it removed Somawansa Amarasinghe. But Somawansa, at that time, was merely a party leader. Today, Anura is not only the party leader but also the Executive President of Sri Lanka.
Viewed in that context, removing him would be far from easy. It would be akin to the JVP strapping on a suicide vest and charging into its own headquarters in Pelawatte.
