After his release from prison following the 1971 rebellion, Rohana Wijeweera entered the 1982 presidential election with high hopes. He believed both he and the JVP would secure a significant share of the vote. However, the results were disappointing—Wijeweera received only 4.9% of the votes.
Despite this setback, he remained optimistic, anticipating a chance to enter Parliament in the upcoming general election. However, President J.R. Jayewardene circumvented this possibility by holding a referendum instead of a general election, effectively blocking Wijeweera’s parliamentary aspirations.
In response, Wijeweera sought legal action against the fraudulent referendum. To do so, he formed an unlikely alliance with his former adversary, Felix Dias Bandaranaike, a key figure in the Bandaranaike family and the Justice Minister in the Samagi Peramuna government. This legal challenge unsettled Jayewardene, who feared the case and the political implications of this unexpected coalition.
In a move to suppress the JVP, Jayewardene accused the party of orchestrating the Black July riots of 1983. Using this as justification, he banned the JVP, recognizing the growing threat it posed to his administration.
J.R.’s party ban was a blessing in disguise for Wijeweera. The reason was that he had understood from the 1982 presidential election results that the JVP could not win elections. He had experience in openly rebelling against the government. He had studied well the failure of the 1971 rebellion.
Realizing that both rebelling against the government and contesting and winning elections had failed, he thought of a new tactic. That is, intimidating the government and the people. He first tried this tactic in the University of Colombo. The Independent Students’ Union was in power at the University of Colombo. The Independent Students’ Union was an organization supported by the traditional left. The leader of the Independent Students’ Union, Daya Pathirana, was a popular figure in the universities.
The JVP-affiliated Inter-University Students’ Union did not tolerate Daya Pathirana and the Independent Students’ Union. The JVP kidnapped Daya Pathirana and killed him. With this murder, the JVP frightened the entire university system. Wijeweera’s tactic was successful. No one in the universities could speak a word against the JVP or the JVP-affiliated Inter-University Students’ Union. Wijeweera then used this tactic against the ruling UNP.
The UNP Chairman, the UNP Urban Council, and Pradeshiya Sabha members were assassinated. Fearing death, they hung banners in front of their houses and assured that they would resign from their positions in the UNP. Wijeweera then spread fear against the traditional left parties. Until then, he sought the support of the main opposition, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party, to eliminate public opposition to his intimidation tactics.
Finally, he spread fear within the SLFP by assassinating SLFP organizers and bombing the presidential election rally of SLFP leader Mrs. Bandaranaike. He realized that by spreading fear, the UNP, SLFP or the traditional left political parties would not abandon politics. He understood that no matter how much fear he spread, people would vote for them.
His last tactic was to spread fear among the public. He imposed unofficial curfews throughout the country and terrified people. This angered people. When the last tactic failed, he unleashed fear into the army. That was the end of him and the JVP.
JVP raised their head once again in the 1994 general election. The JVP came out and contested as the Nation Salvation Front and won one MP seat. During this period, the JVP had no strategy. It was Wimal Weerawansa who found a new strategy for the JVP.
‘all of them together—this time we are for JVP.’
This is one of Wimal’s slogans. JVP tried this new tactic by demanding that they be given power because the two main parties had destroyed the country since independence. Although the JVP became the main force that makes and breaks governments, the people did not give the JVP the power to form a government.
Wimal followed Mahinda abandoning the ‘all of them together’ slogan. JVP allied with Ranil’s UNP.
In 2022, Sri Lanka was declared bankrupt, sparking the ‘Aragalaya’ movement. At this critical moment, the Rajapaksa family—along with the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP), formerly the Sri Lanka Freedom Party, and the United National Party (UNP)—should have united to navigate the crisis. Instead, Ranil Wickremesinghe became president with the backing of the Rajapaksas and the SLPP.
Meanwhile, the strongmen of the People’s Party sought to strike deals with him. This political manoeuvring provided the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) with the perfect opportunity to revive an overlooked slogan ‘all of them together—this time we are for JVP’ and popularize a new rallying cry: “They are all thieves.”
However, the JVP recognized that a slogan alone would not be enough to seize power. Unlike the fear-driven strategy of Rohana Wijeweera in 1986, the party opted for a different approach—spreading falsehoods about its political opponents. The JVP did not stop at targeting Ranil and the Rajapaksas; it also directed misinformation at Sajith Premadasa, even though he had never served as prime minister or president.
Just as Wijeweera sowed fear within political parties, the JVP wove a web of deception against politicians and their leaders. And just as Wijeweera instilled fear among the public, the JVP fueled outrage with misinformation about oil, rice, and gas prices, embedding falsehoods deeply into society.
The parallels between Wijeweera’s fear tactics and the JVP’s propaganda are striking. In the past, people feared Wijeweera’s violent rebellion; today, they are grappling with the consequences of the JVP’s misleading narratives. Just as Wijeweera initially turned public anger against the UNP, the JVP cultivated an illusion of itself as an incorruptible force—akin to a modern-day Robin Hood.
Yet, as the fear spread, people began to see through Wijeweera’s true intentions: not to protect the country, but to destabilize it for political gain. Similarly, as Sri Lanka approaches the 2024 general election, those who once believed in the JVP’s promises realize its campaign was built on deception.
The key question remains: Will the people reject the JVP’s misinformation campaign, just as they ultimately resisted Wijeweera’s reign of fear?
It is still too early to tell.
